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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this 
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Second 
District Court, and the appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. 
(Order Transferring Appeal, R. 1192.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, dismissing Mr. 
Johnson's claims for negligence against the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") 
for injuries Mr. Johnson suffered while driving on Interstate 15 during a repair and 
reconstruction project in Layton, Utah. (Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 862-962 (hereafter f,Opp. Mem.,f).) 
This issue involves four sub-issues: 
a. Whether and to what extent Mr. Johnson's claims are barred by the negligent 
inspection exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(4). (Opp. Mem., R. 876.) 
b. Whether UDOT is relieved of liability of its own negligence in overseeing 
and managing the reconstruction project. (Opp. Mem., R. 877-878.) 
c. Whether UDOT is vicariously liable for negligence of Granite Construction, 
the independent contractor UDOT hired to perform the reconstruction work. (Opp. Mem., 
R. 878-879.) 
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d. Whether and to what extent Mr. Johnson's claims are barred by the dis-
cretionary function exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(1). (Opp. Mem, R. 870-876.) 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences are viewed in a 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Mr. Johnson), and no deference is given to the 
trial court's ruling. R&, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. $63-30-8: 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition 
of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, 
bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a personal injury claim by Craig Johnson against the Utah Department of 
Transportation for serious injuries Mr. Johnson suffered from a dangerous condition on 
Interstate 15. Mr. Johnson was injured in a vehicular accident when the left front tire of his 
car fell into an open pavement cutout on the freeway during a repair and reconstruction 
project. The project required several "full-depth slab replacements," in which sections of 
pavement would be completely removed or "cut out," leaving large, one-foot-deep, full-
lane-width gaps in the pavement. Mr. Johnson was driving in an open travel lane right next 
to the cutouts, with nothing separating the travel lane from the cutouts except for some 
plastic barrels. Mr. Johnson asserts that UDOT was negligent in failing to adequately 
separate the pavement cutouts from the open lanes and in failing to ensure compliance with 
safety measures outlined in its Traffic Control Plan, which was intended specifically to 
prevent the type of accident that occurred. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Johnson initiated this action on October 3, 1997, against UDOT and Granite 
Construction Company, the contractor that performed the reconstruction work. (Complaint, 
R. 1-5.) UDOT answered on November 7, 1997. (UDOT Answer, R. 29-34.) A trial was 
set and continued seven times. (Trial Continuances, R. 86-87; 128; 178-180; 398-401; 501-
504; 547-549; 557-559.) On October 16, 2002, UDOT moved for summary judgment. 
(Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 676-677.) A hearing on the motion took place on 
November 19, 2002, and the court granted UDOT's motion. (Hearing Transcript, R. 1195.) 
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An order dismissing Mr. Johnson's claim against UDOT was entered on January 8, 2003, 
the trial court certifying the ruling as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). (Order Granting Def-
endant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 1157-1160, Addendum Exhibit 1 hereto.) Mr. 
Johnson filed his notice of appeal on January 23, 2003. (Notice of Appeal, R. 1174-1175.) 
Statement of Facts 
A. Mr. Johnson's Accident. 
Craig Johnson was seriously injured on September 14, 1996, when his car's left front 
tire fell into a 12- to 18-inch-deep pavement cutout which had been removed during a 
highway repair and reconstruction project planned, authorized, funded, and supervised by 
UDOT. (See Amended Complaint, R. 97-101.) Mr. Johnson was traveling southbound on 
Interstate 15 in Layton when he encountered Project No. IM-15-7(191)332, otherwise 
known as the "Layton-Clearfield Project" or the "Project." The Layton-Clearfield Project 
involved removing and replacing large slabs of pavement. (Amended Complaint ^ 9-11, 
R. 98-99; Memo. Supp. Def. UDOT's Motion for Summ. J. ("UDOT Memo."), R. 680.) 
After Mr. Johnson's vehicle tire fell into the first cutout, which was thirty-four feet long, he 
lost control of his vehicle, and rolled through two more cutouts. (Amended Complaint f^ 11, 
R. 99; Deposition of Trooper Greg Lundell, R. 884.) 
There was no barrier separating Mr. Johnson's lane of travel from the cutouts in the 
freeway. Instead, plastic barrels were simply set up along the edge of Mr. Johnson's travel 
lane, inside the cutouts. (Lundell Depo., R. 886; Photographs, R. 911-12, Addendum 
Exhibit 2.) In addition to the plastic barrels, UDOT's "Traffic Control Plan" for the Project 
required white striping along the edge of the travel lane and a two- or three-foot horizontal 
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buffer zone between the striping and the barrels. (See Traffic Control Plan Diagrams, R. 
900, 951, Add. Ex. 3; Nichols Depo., R. 903-05.) And most importantly, the Traffic 
Control Plan expressly required that during Phase Four of the Project, when Mr. Johnson 
was injured, only one lane of traffic was to be open during off-peak hours, including night-
time. (See Diagram.) Phase Four required slab replacement to be done in the center lane of 
the freeway. Thus, under the Plan, when the pavement cutouts were in the center lane, the 
adjacent lane was supposed to be closed, thus providing for another eleven feet of hor-
izontal separation between the travel lane and the cutouts. (See id.; see also Bid Proposal, 
Supplemental Specifications, Special Provisions, f^ 108.4.2.6, R. 949.) 
These important aspects of the Traffic Control Plan were ignored on the night of Mr. 
Johnson's accident. As explained above, the lane next to the cutouts was open to traffic, 
. even though it was nighttime and the Plan required the lane to be closed. (See Lundell 
Report, R. 779; Deposition of Jimmie Keyes, Granite Employee, R. 954-55.) A UDOT 
field inspector had specifically authorized that lane to be open when no workers were 
actually on the scene. (Keyes Depo., R. 955-56.) Moreover, the travel lanes lacked any 
striping identifying the edge of the pavement, nor was there the required horizontal buffer 
between the edge of the travel lane and the barrels. (Photographs, R. 910-11, Add. Ex. 2.) 
Mr. Johnson suffered a fractured dislocation of the talus with a fractured talar neck 
and rotation of the talar body. Mr. Johnson is permanently disabled as a result of the 
accident. He suffers a midfoot cavus deformity which requires specific arch support, 
special shoes, and a potential mid-foot osteotomy. (See Photographs, R. 913.) 
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B. The Original Decision to Use Plastic Barrels. 
Defendant Granite Construction Company ("Granite") was the independent 
contractor UDOT chose to perform the work on the Layton-Clearfield Project. The Project 
involved joint repair and slab replacement on sections of Interstate 15 in Davis County, 
requiring 12- to 18-inch-deep pavement cutouts. (UDOT Memo., R. 680.) When a 
construction project involves more than a six-inch-deep cutout in the pavement, concrete 
barriers are recommended by the Federal Highway Administration to protect the motoring 
public. (FHA Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs in Construction and Main-
tenance Work Zones, R. 957-958, Add. Ex. 4; Deposition of Phil Paskett, UDOT Traffic 
Control Inspector, R. 917-918.) Indeed, UDOT had used concrete barriers on similar 
projects in the past. (Lundell Depo. R. 887; Deposition of Chuck Lindsay, Granite Project 
Engineer, R. 744.) Yet UDOT did not use the recommended concrete barriers on the 
Layton-Clearfield Project. (Lundell Depo., R. 883; Photographs, R. 911-12, Add. Ex. 2.) 
Instead, UDOT used plastic barrels as the only means of separating the motoring 
public from the cutouts. (UDOT Memo., R. 680, ^ 2; Traffic Control Plan Diagrams, R. 
900, 951, Add. Ex. 3.) UDOT was unableE5 identify who designed the Traffic Control Plan 
or who recommended the plastic barrels. In fact, UDOT admits it may have been a lower 
level employee. (Deposition of Dyke LeFevre, UDOT Region One Director, R. 932-34; 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (MUDOT Reply 
Memo.,f),R. 1029, ffi[ 10-11.) 
UDOT used plastic barrels on the Project because they were cheaper than concrete 
barriers. (Deposition of Kevin Griffin, UDOT Field Engineer, R. 961-962; Lindsay Depo., 
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R. 744; LeFevre Depo., R. 939; Trooper Lundell Depo., R. 886.) The decision to forego the 
concrete barriers was made by Dyke LeFevre, UDOT's Region One Director. Mr. LeFevre 
did not discuss the decision to use plastic barrels with his superior, Mr. Clint Topham. 
(LeFevre Depo., R. 932, 936-937.) Mr. LeFevre did not utilize any safety studies nor hire 
an outside opinion before making the decision. (LeFevre Depo., R. 928.) 
C. The Change Order Decision 
Immediately prior to commencement of the Project, Granite contacted UDOT 
regarding safety concerns. (See Letter from Granite to UDOT, March 29, 1996, R. 757-
760.) Granite asked UDOT to approve a "change order" allowing Granite to install 
concrete barriers and reduce the speed limit to 55 mph. Granite pointed out that using 
concrete barriers would improve worker and driver safety, reduce the Project's impact on 
traffic because two lanes could safely be open at all times, and allow the Project to be com-
pleted sooner because the workers could work more efficiently. (Id.) Granite stated that if 
the concrete barriers were used, the Project could be completed 28 days earlier. (Id.) 
Granite further emphasized that regardless of UDOT's approval of the concrete barriers, the 
speed limit should be reduced to 55 mph, as the Traffic Control Plan was designed with a 
55 mph speed limit, which had later been raised to 65 mph.1 (Id.) The request was for-
warded to Dyke LeFevre, UDOT's Region One Director, with an estimated cost increase of 
$767,885.00. (Id at R. 760.) 
1
 At the time the traffic control plan was devised the speed limit on 1-15 was 55 mph 
for the entire state. After the Federal restrictions were lifted in 1995, the speed limit was 
then raised to 65 mph on several portions of 1-15, including the area subsequently included 
in the Layton-Clearfield Project. 
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UDOT's project engineer, Kent Nichols, responded that Mr. LeFevre believed "the 
Commission"2 would approve the change order if Granite could keep the cost at $450,000 
with a "50 days time saving." (Letter from UDOT to Granite, April 2, 1996, R. 762-763.) 
Granite responded that it could complete the change order for $494,832 (if UDOT supplied 
certain "attenuators"), with a 28-day time savings. (See Letter from Granite to UDOT, 
April 11, 1996, R. 765.) Granite's final proposal was thus less than $50,000 over UDOT's 
proposal, with a 22-day difference in the completion dates. Notably, UDOT never cited any 
reason other than cost for rejecting Granite's proposal. In fact, UDOT even admitted below 
that Granite could have used concrete barriers for the Project at its own cost. (See UDOT 
Memo., R. 6884 23.) 
When a vehicle drove into a pavement cutout on July 2, 1996, soon after two Granite 
employees had vacated that area to obtain more supplies, Granite renewed its change order 
request for concrete barriers and a 55 mph speed limit. (See Letter from Granite to UDOT, 
July 2, 1996, R. 767 ("July Request").) Granite reiterated its concern that "safety" was 
being ignored because "dollars had been the guiding factor." (Id.) Granite's July letter also 
sought approval to eliminate their employees' night shifts since they were having the 
greatest safety concerns night. (Id.) Mr. Nichols forwarded this request to Mr. LeFevre and 
Clint Topham. (Memo, from Kent Nichols to Dyke LeFevre, July 2, 1996, R. 769.) Mr. 
Nichols concurred with Granite's concerns and informed his superiors that there was an 
2
 Presumably, Mr. Nichols was referring to the Transportation Commission. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 72-1-301 to -303. 
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"over-whelming feeling" that safety was not being given "adequate consideration." (Id.) 
Mr. Nichols reiterated the increased danger during the nighttime hours. (Id.) 
Mr. LeFevre denied the July Request to reduce the speed limit and add concrete 
barriers. Mr. LeFevre testified that he spoke to Mr. Topham regarding the July Request and 
was told to make the decision based on the costs. (LeFevre Depo., R. 938-39.) As with the 
first change order request, Mr. LeFevre did not take the July Request to the "commission." 
(Id., R. 940.) There was never a written denial or explanation of the July Request. Mr. 
LeFevre testified it was Mr. Nichols' responsibility to answer the July Request. (Id., R. 
926.) 
Mr. LeFevre did not speak with the FFIA regarding the decision to deny the change 
order requests. (Id., R. 938.) No written reports or safety analysis were used in denying the 
requests. (Id., R. 938, 941.) Mr. LeFevre testified he made decisions to approve or deny 
change order requests every day, and that there was nothing unusual about the request in the 
present case. (Id., R. 941-42.) UDOT's reason for denying the change order requests, 
initiated after additional safety issues arose, was solely financial. (Griffin Depo., R. 961-
962; Lindsay Depo., R. 744; LeFevre Depo., R. 938-39.) 
D. Negligent Violations of the Traffic Control Plan 
As noted earlier, UDOT's Traffic Control Plan was violated in several ways during 
the Layton-Clearfield Project. Mr. Johnson was injured during Phase Four of the Project, 
while driving during nighttime off-peak hours. Because the Layton-Clearfield Project in-
volved deep pavement cutouts and concrete barriers were omitted, the Traffic Control Plan 
called for a white solid line followed by a two-foot buffer zone prior to placement of plastic 
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barrels. (Traffic Control Plan Diagram, R. 951, Add. Ex. 3; Nichols Depo., R. 903-905.) 
During off-peak hours of Phase Four, the Plan additionally allowed only one lane of travel 
to be open, to provide further distance between the construction cutouts and the motoring 
public. (See Traffic Control Plan Diagram, R. 951, Add. Ex. 3; Traffic Control Plan 
Special Provision 108.4.2.6, R. 949; Nichols Depo., R. 903-905; Paskett Depo., R. 917-918; 
Keyes Depo., R. 763; Photographs, R. 910-911, Add. Ex. 2.) Indeed, Mr. LeFevre admitted 
that he did not expect traffic to be allowed right next to the open cutouts under the Plan. 
(LeFevre Depo., R. 1060 ("Q: In this case, why you didn't think that was going to 
applicable is the Traffic Control Plan shows you wouldn't be traveling next to an open 
cutout? A: Yes.").) 
Five significant violations of UDOT's Traffic Control Plan contributed to Mr. 
Johnson's accident. First, the inside lane of travel was open, even though it was nighttime, 
which allowed Mr. Johnson to travel right next to the cutouts on the dark freeway. (See 
Lundell Report, R. 779.) Second, there was no white striping to delineate the construction 
zone from the travel lane. (Photographs, R. 910-12, Add. Ex. 2.) Third, there was no 
buffer zone to isolate the construction zone from Mr. Johnson's vehicle. (See id.) Fourth, 
several of the plastic barrels were placed inside of the pavement cutouts, thereby channeling 
Mr. Johnson's vehicle into the cutouts. (See id.) Fifth, some of the barrels were missing. 
(See id.) Since there was no white striping and misplaced barrels, no boundary existed 
between the inside lane and the construction zone. Mr. Johnson was traveling in the lane 
which should have been closed pursuant to UDOT's TCP when he fell into the cutouts. 
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UDOT personnel were overseeing the Layton-Clearfield Project daily. (See July 2 
Letter from Granite to UDOT, R. 767 (noting that the Plan and driving speeds "have put our 
people and UDOT employees in jeopardy every night").) When safety issues arose, such as 
accidents or missing/misplaced barriers, UDOT was contacted to remedy the problem. (See 
Lundell Depo., R. 883.) UDOT's project engineer, Kent Nichols, was responsible for 
interpreting the Plan and implementing it in association with UDOT's field engineer, Kevin 
Griffin. (LeFevre Depo., R. 925-26.) Mr. Nichols admitted, however, that he had never 
worked on a slab replacement project which involved working along side of traffic prior to 
this project. (Nichols Depo., R. 908.) 
One of UDOT's on-site inspectors, Mr. Griffin or Mr. Paskett, instructed Granite to 
open the second lane travel, in violation of UDOT's Traffic Control Plan. (Keyes Depo., R. 
954-55.) The day-to-day decisions on how to implement and interpret the Plan were made 
by UDOT's agents at the construction site. If Granite wanted to make any changes to Mr. 
Nichols' interpretation or Mr. Griffin's implementation, the requests needed to be in writing 
and approved by UDOT. (Deposition of Randy S. Hunter, Granite Project Engineer, R. 
773; Paskett Depo., R. 920.) Mr. LeFevre testified that he would not have approved of 
having the second lane open with no buffer zone and barrels inside the cutouts. (LeFevre 
Depo.,R. 1061.) 
E. The Summary Judgment Proceeding Below 
UDOT moved for summary judgment, contending that (1) UDOT's decision to 
forego concrete barriers was immunized under the discretionary function provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and (2) UDOT was not liable for the violations of the 
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Traffic Control Plan that caused Mr. Johnson's injury because it was the sole responsibility 
of Granite Construction, an independent contractor, to execute the construction and comply 
with the Plan. (UDOT Memo, at R. 679.) In support of the first point, UDOT relied 
primarily on an affidavit Mr. LeFevre signed, and asserted that Mr. LeFevre made the 
decision not to use barriers after considering "several key factors." (See id. at R. 682.) In 
support of its second point, UDOT did not dispute that it or Granite had been negligent; 
instead, UDOT relied on the contract between itself and Granite to argue that even if UDOT 
and/or Granite had been negligent in violation from the Traffic Control Plan, Granite would 
be the only liable party. (See id, R. 683-84, 703-06.) 
In response, Mr. Johnson disputed that the decision to forego concrete barriers was 
immune from liability. Mr. Johnson contended that that decision was an operational 
decision made by Mr. LeFevre, no different from the decisions he makes every day, and 
was made solely to save some money, not to advance safety. (Opp. Mem., R. 871-74.) 
Regarding UDOT's liability for the violations of the Plan, Mr. Johnson did not dispute 
UDOT's facts concerning the contents of the UDOT-Granite contract, but Mr. Johnson 
argued that notwithstanding that contract, UDOT was liable both for its own participation in 
the Project and for Granite's negligence under the peculiar risk and inherently dangerous 
work doctrines. (See Oppo Mem. at R. 877-79.) 
The trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Johnson's claims with 
prejudice. (Order, Add. Ex. 1.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Johnson's 
claim against UDOT should be reversed. Mr. Johnson's complaint alleges that UDOT is 
liable for numerous negligent acts, both its own and Granite's. And UDOT did not con-
trovert those allegations. Instead, UDOT claimed that it was relieved of liability under the 
Governmental Immunity Act and common law negligence doctrine. 
UDOT is simply wrong. First, neither the Act nor the common law excuses UDOT 
from liability for authorizing Granite to open the second lane of travel during Phase Four of 
the project. By authorizing this lane to be open, UDOT created a dangerous situation by 
having traffic driving on a dark freeway, right next to the dangerous cutouts, with nothing 
separating the cars from the cutouts. This is exactly why Mr. Johnson was injured. 
UDOT claimed below that the negligent inspection exception to the Act's waiver of 
immunity barred Mr. Johnson's claim, but that doctrine clearly does not apply. Mr. 
Johnson's claim is clearly not based on negligent "inspection," but on negligently author-
izing the lane to be open in violation of its own Plan. Further, recent case law from the 
Utah Supreme Court and this Court establishes that the negligent inspection doctrine applies 
only to regulatory or quasi-regulatory inspections of third parties, not to a governmental 
entity's "inspection" of its own property to find and remedy dangerous conditions. 
Similarly, UDOT's contract with Granite Construction does not relieve UDOT of 
liability to Mr. Johnson. As the entity statutorily responsible for Interstate 15, UDOT had a 
duty to take reasonable steps during the Project to keep that freeway reasonably safe. Even 
though the contract required Granite to do the actual repair and replacement work, UDOT 
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retained a measure of control over Granite, particularly with respect to Granite's execution 
of the Traffic Control Plan, and UDOT had a duty to reasonably use that power to keep the 
freeway safe. And UDOT had a nondelegable duty to the public to keep the freeway 
reasonably safe, and as such UDOT is vicariously liable for Granite's negligence in carrying 
out the work. Indeed, section 418 of the Restatement of Torts expressly recognizes that a 
highway authority is vicariously liable for a contractor's negligence during a reconstruction 
project, and that provision controls here. 
In addition to being liable for authorizing the second lane to be open, UDOT is also 
not relieved from liability for the other negligent departures from the its Plan, including 
failure to provide striping to denote the edge of the safe lane of travel, failing to provide a 
buffer zone, and failure to ensure that all the barrels were in place. Once again, these are 
not merely matters of "inspection" under the Act, and UDOT is liable both for its own 
negligence and for Granite's negligence under the retained control and nondelegable duty 
doctrines. 
Finally, the discretionary function exception does not immunize UDOT from liability 
for its failure to use a concrete barrier to separate the freeway traffic from the cutouts. 
UDOT claims that the decision was made after considering "several key factors," but a jury 
could easily infer that the only reason UDOT did not use concrete barriers was to save 
money. Simply because UDOT selected a dangerous alternative that was cheaper than the 
recommended procedure, at the expense of public safety, does not mean as a matter of law 
that a governmental entity is immune from liability. If this were the law, every negligent act 
by a governmental entity would be immune. Safety features almost always cost some 
14 
money, for private entities as well as for the government, and there is no evidence in the 
record suggesting that the amount of money required in the present case would have 
impacted UDOT's operations or otherwise required a "governmental" choice. Further, 
UDOT did not establish that Mr. LeFevre acted at the immunized policy-making level, 
which is also required for the discretionary function exception to apply. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. JOHNSON'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST UDOT. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if the 
moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [2] 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). to 
obtain summary judgment, the moving party must submit sufficient evidence or otherwise 
establish its right to judgment. The movant has an "affirmative burden," Lamb v. B & B 
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993), and if the movant fails to demonstrate 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion must be denied. E.g., Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (because moving party's affidavit 
failed to negate existence of disputed issue of fact, nonmoving party had no burden to 
present evidence in response on that issue). 
Mr. Johnson alleged in his Amended Complaint that UDOT is generally liable for, 
inter alia, failing to provide a safe lane of traffic, failing to provide a safe zone between the 
travel lane and the construction area, failing to adequately illuminate the area. (Amended 
Complaint fflf 12(c), (d), (f), R. 99.) Mr. Johnson further alleges that UDOT is liable for 
failure to supervise and control Granite and is vicariously liable for Granite's negligence 
15 
because Granite was engaged in the construction of the freeway under UDOTs direction 
and therefore was UDOTs agent. (Amended Complaint YH 3, 13, R. 97-99.) Further, Mr. 
Johnson presented evidence below of several distinct negligent actions and omissions by 
UDOT and/or Granite Construction that contributed to his accident: (1) allowing a lane of 
traffic to be open right along the 12-inch-deep drop-offs at night on the unlighted freeway; 
(2) failing to provide striping at the edge of the travel lane along the drop-offs; (3) failing to 
provide a two-foot buffer between the travel lane and the drop-off; (4) allowing the plastic 
marker barrels to be placed inside the drop-off instead of on the surface; (5) failing to 
ensure that all barrels were properly in place, and (6) failing to use a concrete barrier to 
separate the freeway driving traffic from the drop-offs. Accordingly, UDOT is not entitled 
to summary judgment unless UDOT establishes as a matter of law that it is immune from 
liability for all of these acts or omissions. UDOT did not make this showing below and 
cannot do so here. 
A. UDOT is liable for the injuries Mr. Johnson suffered as a result of UDOTfs 
allowing a lane of traffic to be open next to the 12-inch deep cutouts at night. 
The Traffic Control Plan allowed only one lane to be open for off-peak hours during 
Phase Four of the Project, when full-depth slab replacement was taking place in the center 
lane of the freeway. (Traffic Control Plan Diagram, R. 951, Addendum Exhibit 3.) Under 
the Plan, the 12-inch-deep pavement cutouts would be approximately eleven feet from the 
travel lane. A UDOT on-site inspector, however, authorized or directed Granite Con-
struction to open a second lane of travel, thus bringing traffic driving at freeway speeds 
within inches of the cutouts. (See Keyes Depo., R. 954-55.) 
16 
In its motion below, UDOT did not controvert Mr. Johnson's allegations in this 
regard. In fact, UDOT did not dispute (for purposes of the motion) that "UDOT's field 
engineer or inspector gave Granite authority to open two lanes of traffic during off-peak 
hours if there were no workers in that part of the construction zone." (UDOT Reply Memo. 
at R. 1031.) Instead, UDOT claimed that it was not liable because (1) the negligent 
inspection provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act shielded it from liability, and (2) 
its contract with Granite required that Granite perform all of the work on the Project. Both 
arguments fail. 
1. The "negligent inspection" exception to the Act's waiver of immunity 
does not shield UDOT from liability. 
The "negligent inspection" exception to the Act's waiver of immunity states that a 
governmental entity is not liable for "a failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4). That provision does 
not apply to Mr. Johnson's claims, however. 
First, Mr. Johnson's claim is not based on UDOT's failure to "inspect" the con-
struction work, or for an "inadequate or negligent inspection" as required for immunity 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4). Rather, as noted above, Mr. Johnson's claim is based 
on UDOT's negligently authorizing the second lane of traffic to be open, in violation of its 
own Plan. That negligent act, which has nothing to do with "inspection," is enough to 
subject UDOT to liability. Mr. Johnson's claim is also based on UDOT's failure to do 
anything about the dangerous condition of the highway, i.e., the fact that traffic was being 
allowed to drive at freeway speeds right along the edge of the cutouts. In short, 
"inspection" has little, if anything, to do with Mr. Johnson's claim. 
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Second, even if the claim were construed as one for inadequate "oversight" of the 
Project, the negligent inspection exception still would not allow UDOT to escape liability, 
because that provision simply does not apply to a governmental entity's failure to ensure the 
safety of its own property. See Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993); 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270-71 (Utah 1995); Ilott v. University of 
Utah, 2000 UT App 286,1fl[6-16, 12 P.3d 1011. These cases establish that the negligent 
inspection exception applies to regulatory inspections of property belonging to third parties, 
such as building inspections, and not to instances in which a government employee 
"inspects" the entity's own property to ensure the safety of that property. 
In Ericksen, the court questioned whether the negligent inspection exception would 
apply because the negligent city employee "served as an inspector for the City as the owner 
of the property and as a party to the construction contract. He functioned differently from a 
city inspector who inspects construction on private property for compliance with building, 
fire, electric, and other safety codes!' Ericksen, 858 P.2d at 997-98 (emphasis added). 
Ericksen was ultimately decided on other grounds, but in Nixon, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly held that the exception did not immunize Salt Lake City from liability for 
negligently failing to maintain its own equipment, explaining that "the actions at issue here 
were not an inspection." Nixon, 898 P.2d at 270-71. Finally, in Ilott, this court held that the 
negligent inspection doctrine did not immunize the University of Utah from liability for 
negligently "inspecting" its own stadium bleachers for defects: 
Obviously, this case is different: The University crew was employed by the 
University to maintain University property. The University has not 
mentioned the need to inspect for compliance with safety codes and was not 
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engaging in a "regulatory activity" when its crew inspected the bleachers for 
defects. 
I A l 14. 
Ericksen, Nixon, and Ilott unquestionably defeat UDOT's suggestion that the 
negligent inspection exception immunizes it from liability. 1-15 was UDOT's own property, 
not the property of a third party.3 UDOT therefore cannot escape liability by relying on 
Section 63-30-10(4). 
2. UDOT cannot escape liability for Mr. Johnson's injuries merely 
because it hired Granite Construction to perform the actual 
construction work. 
a. UDOT is directly liable for its own negligence in failing to 
ensure that 1-15 was safe during the Project. 
In addition to claiming immunity under the negligent inspection exception, UDOT 
also attempted to avoid liability by claiming that Granite Construction was solely respon-
sible for the safety of the freeway during the Project. The only evidence UDOT submitted 
on this point was the contract between itself and Granite. This, however, is not enough to 
establish UDOT's right to judgment as a matter of law. 
First, UDOT cited no authority below holding that a landowner's contract with a 
third party could somehow eliminate the landowner's duty to the public to provide safe 
property. Tort duties are imposed by law for the benefit of foreseeable victims of a defend-
ant's negligence. As such, a defendant subject to such a duty cannot escape that duty merely 
3
 Also, applying the negligent inspection exception here would effectively nullify 
the Act's waivers of immunity for unsafe highways and dangerous structures, as practically 
any injury resulting from an unreasonably dangerous highway or public building could be 
characterized as being caused, at least in part, by a governmental entity's failure to properly 
"inspect" the highway or building. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-8 and -9. 
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because a third party agrees to it. Put another way, if A has a duty to the public, he or she 
cannot make that duty disappear simply by entering into an agreement with B. Thus, the 
terms of the contract between UDOT and Granite cannot eviscerate UDOT's duty to Mr. 
Johnson to provide a safe roadway. 
Second, as alluded to above, Mr. Johnson's claim against UDOT is not based merely 
on UDOT's passively negligent failure to correct a hazard caused by Granite. Instead, Mr. 
Johnson also claims that his injuries were caused by UDOT's own active negligence in 
expressly authorizing the second lane to be opened in violation of the Plan. Before the trial 
court, UDOT cited nothing in the UDOT-Granite contract providing that UDOT would not 
be liable to the public for its own actions. (See UDOT-Granite Contract Provisions, R. 721-
22.) Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that any such provision would exist, and even if it did, 
it would likely violate public policy. Cf Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 (construction contract 
may not indemnify party against its own negligence). 
Third, UDOT undeniably has a duty to Mr. Johnson and the rest of the driving public 
to provide a safe roadway, and there is no reason to believe that this duty disappears while a 
contractor is working on part of that roadway. UDOT, as the entity responsible for 1-15, 
had a duty to provide a roadway that was safe for travel. See, e.g., Rollow v. Ogden City, 
66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791, 794-95 (1926) ("[I]n maintaining the public streets and highways 
within the limits of such cities and towns a positive legal duty is imposed to maintain them 
in a reasonably safe condition for travel.") (emphasis added). In fact, the Utah Code 
expressly provides that UDOT shall provide "safe" transportation systems, and when 
UDOT closes part of a road for construction, UDOT "shall cause suitable barriers and 
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notices to be posted and maintained." Utah Code Ann. §§72-1-201(4), 72-6-114(2) 
(emphasis added). UDOT's duty applies during a construction project, regardless of 
whether the project is being undertaken by an independent contractor. See, e.g., 39 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets & Bridges § 392, at 882 (1999) (,f[T]he duty of the public 
authority to keep its highways reasonably safe for travel is not abrogated or suspended by 
reason of the fact that a third person is doing construction work within the limits of the 
highway, or that he is making repairs therein.") (emphasis added). 
Indeed, in a related context, Utah courts have recognized that where a property 
owner owes a duty to the public to use reasonable care to provide safe premises, the owner 
may be liable for dangers that are caused not by the owner or its employees, but also for 
dangers caused by third persons. See, e.g., Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 
476 (Utah 1996). Liability in such a situation turns on whether the owner knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the dangerous condition, and whether 
the owner acted reasonably in failing to remedy it. That reasoning applies equally in the 
present situation: Because UDOT specifically authorized the opening of the second lane, 
UDOT clearly knew that traffic was being allowed to drive right along the cutouts. At the 
very least, UDOT should have known what was happening on 1-15 in Layton, and had a 
duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that Granite complied with the Plan by keeping the 
second lane closed during off-peak hours while full-depth slab replacement was taking 
place on the third lane. 
The "retained control" doctrine also confirms that UDOT had a duty to exercise due 
care to ensure that 1-15 remained safe during the construction period. The retained control 
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doctrine provides when a party retains some control over the way in which an independent 
contractor performs its work, the party must exercise that control with due regard for the 
safety of others: 
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the 
control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to 
others for whose safely the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, 
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §414 (1965) (emphasis added) (Addendum Exhibit 5 
hereto) {quoted in Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 327 (Utah 1999)). 
In Thompson, the Utah Supreme Court formally adopted this doctrine, explaining 
that one who hires an independent contractor is responsible for the contractor's work when 
the principal "actively participates" in the work. Citing the Restatement, the court stated 
that the doctrine applies where the principal "exert[s] such control over the means utilized 
that the contractor cannot carry out the injwy-causing aspect of the work in his or her own 
way" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Restatement § 414, cmt. c). 
The Thompson court ultimately held that the retained control doctrine did not apply 
in that case because the defendant exercised no control over the work. In Thompson, the 
defendant motel owner had ordered a long narrow steel pipe, and when it was delivered she 
asked the deliverymen to install the pipe vertically over a pipe stub. She then went inside, 
and one of the deliverymen was injured trying to install the pipe without proper equipment. 
See id. at 323-24. Except for informally asking that the pipe be installed, the defendant had 
nothing to do the actual installation. 
The present case, however, fits squarely within the retained control doctrine, because 
UDOT exercised a great deal of control over the manner in which the reconstruction was 
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done. UDOT formulated the Traffic Control Plan and expressly required Granite to comply 
with that Plan in doing the work. (Granite-UDOT Contract If 107.6, R. 722.) The contract 
provided that "[sjigns, barriers, barricades, lights, or other protective devices shall not be 
dismantled or removed without permission of the ENGINEER" (Id. (emphasis added).) 
UDOT had employees on the site overseeing the construction, and if Granite wanted 
changes made in the traffic control methods, Granite needed UDOT's permission. (See 
UDOT-Granite Correspondence, R. 750-769; Deposition of Randy S. Hunter, R. 773.) 
Granite thus did not have the ability to carry out the "injury-causing aspect of the work," 
i.e., the opening of the second lane during nighttime hours, in Granite's own way. 
The evidence UDOT presented below was not sufficient to establish as a matter of 
law that UDOT had no ability to exercise any control over Granite. A jury could reasonably 
conclude that regardless of whether UDOT could direct particular workers to perform 
particular tasks at particular times, UDOT clearly had the power, pursuant to its contract 
with Granite Construction, to insist that Granite comply with the Traffic Control Plan. 
Under the retained control doctrine, because UDOT had the power to insist that Granite 
maintain 1-15 in a reasonably safe condition, UDOT had the duty to do so. Therefore, 
because UDOT has not established a lack of duty as a matter of law, UDOT has not 
established its right to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Johnson's claims against it for 
allowing the unsafe condition of the freeway. 
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b. UDOT is vicariously liable for Granite Construction's negligence in 
carrying out the work because UDOT had a nondelegable duty to 
ensure a safe freeway. 
Finally, even if UDOT had no direct involvement in the opening of the second lane, 
and even if UDOT itself had not breached its own duty to ensure a safe roadway during the 
construction, UDOT still would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because 
UDOT is liable for Granite Construction's negligence under the nondelegable duty doctrine. 
Under that doctrine, certain duties are important enough to public safety that those duties 
cannot simply be "delegated" by an independent contractor. See 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law 
of Torts § 337, at 920-21 (West 2001). Among other situations, a duty is considered 
nondelegable when the work at issue involves "peculiar risks" or "special dangers." See id. 
at 921; Thompson, 979 P.2d at 329. 
There is no doubt that the duty to maintain highways in safe condition is non-
delegable. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has long held that "[a] city is charged with the 
nondelegable duty to exercise due care in maintaining streets and sidewalks within their 
corporate limits in a reasonably safe condition." E.g., Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 896, 
897 (Utah 1976); accord Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1982). This 
statement was addressed to municipalities rather than the state, but there is no reason to 
think that UDOT's duty would be any more delegable than a city's. Therefore, UDOT 
cannot deny liability for its failure to maintain 1-15 in a safe condition by claiming that it 
delegated its duties to Granite Construction. 
The Restatement of Torts affirms this conclusion. In Sections 416 through 429, the 
Restatement discusses several variations and examples of the nondelegable duty doctrine, 
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including the peculiar risk and inherently dangerous work doctrines discussed in Thompson 
v. Jess. See Thompson, 979 P.2d at 329. These sections of the Restatement "impose 
vicarious liability on the principal employer for the contractor's negligence, even if the 
employer reasonably provides for precautions in the contract work." Id (discussing 
Restatement sections 416 and 427). And as one specific application of the peculiar risk 
doctrine, the Restatement expressly provides that a highway authority is vicariously liable 
for the negligence of an independent contractor hired to perform road construction: 
One who is under a duty to construct or maintain a highway in a reasonably 
safe condition for the use of the public, and who entrusts its construction, 
maintenance, or repair to an independent contractor, is subject to the same 
liability for physical harm to persons using the highway while it is held open 
for travel during such work, caused by the negligent failure of the contractor 
to make it reasonably safe for travel, as though the employer had retained the 
work in its own hands. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §418(1) (emphasis added) (Addendum Exhibit 6 hereto). 
See also Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 10 P.3d 625, 627-28 (Ariz. 2000) (adopting Section 418 
and holding that because the contractor was acting on the city's behalf in maintaining the 
streetlights, the contractor "was the City's agent for the performance of that non-delegable 
duty."). 
Restatement section 418 makes absolutely clear that UDOT had a nondelegable duty 
under the peculiar risk doctrine. UDOT had a duty to maintain 1-15 in a reasonably safe 
condition, and entrusted its repair to Granite Construction. Therefore, UDOT is liable for 
injuries caused by Granite's negligence, just as if UDOT had done with its own crews. 
Once again, the evidence UDOT submitted below - the contract between UDOT 
and Granite - is not sufficient to establish that UDOT is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
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law on Mr. Johnson's claim for injuries resulting from the decision to open the second 
traffic lane, thus bringing traffic right next to the slab replacement work. UDOT is liable 
both for its own negligence and for Granite's negligence, and the Governmental Immunity 
Act does not protect UDOT from this liability. 
B. UDOT is not immune from liability for the other violations of the Traffic 
Control Plan, including the lack of striping along the work zone, the lack of a 
buffer zone, the placement of the barrels inside the cutouts, and the failure to 
replace missing barrels. 
In addition to opening the second lane, UDOT and Granite also violated the Traffic 
Control Plan by (1) failing to provide white striping along the edge of the travel lane closest 
to the work zone, (2) provide a two-foot buffer between the travel lane and the work zone, 
(3) placing the barrels inside the pavement cutouts, and (4) failing to replace missing 
barrels.4 Mr. Johnson has a valid claim against UDOT for these actions and omissions for 
the same reasons that he has a valid claim for allowing the second lane to be open. First, 
the negligent inspection exception does not shield UDOT from liability because the actions 
and omissions at issue do not constitute "inspections" pursuant to Section 63-30-10(4). 
Second, UDOT's hiring of Granite Construction to perform the work does not relieve 
UDOT from liability, as UDOT remains liable both for its own negligence and for Granite's 
negligence in carrying out the construction. Because a jury could find that UDOT had the 
power to ensure Granite's compliance with the Traffic Control Plan, the jury could find 
that UDOT was negligent in failing to use that power to make sure that the lanes were 
marked, that a buffer zone was provided, and that barrels were properly placed, all of 
4
 The Traffic Control Plan may have allowed for barrels to be placed inside the 
cutouts, but that Plan contemplated the striping, buffer zone, and extra closed lane as well. 
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which the Plan required. And the nondelegable duty doctrine as expressed in Murray v 
Odgen City, Thompson v. Jess, and the Restatement of Torts applies equally to these 
other violations of the Traffic Control Plan. Mr. Johnson's claims against UDOT for these 
other departures from the Traffic Control Plan should therefore be reinstated. 
C. UDOT is not immune from liability for failing to require concrete barriers to 
separate the freeway traffic from the work zone. 
Finally, Mr. Johnson has a valid claim against UDOT for its inexcusable failure to 
use concrete barriers to separate the freeway traffic from the construction zones. The trial 
court dismissed this claim under the discretionary function exception, but UDOT failed to 
establish as a matter of law that the failure to use barriers meets the strict requirements of 
the discretionary function exception. At the very least, factual issues exist that preclude 
summary judgment. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides only a limited immunity to govern-
mental entities for injuries arising out of the exercise of discretionary functions: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury prox-
imately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per -
form a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (emphasis added). Discretionary function immunity "was not 
designed to cloak the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity in modern garb." Nelson v. 
Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996). Instead, it is a "distinct, more limited form 
of immunity that should be applied only when a plaintiff is challenging a governmental 
decision that involves a basic policy-making function." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
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"[n]ot every governmental action involving discretion is a discretionary function within the 
meaning of the Act." Truiillo v. Utah Dep't of Trans., 1999 UT App 227, ^ 21, 986 P.2d 
752. Instead, discretionary function immunity is "limited to broad policy decisions 
'requiring evaluation of basic governmental policy matters, not operational and ministerial 
acts!" Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 5, ^|28, 40 P.3d 591 
(emphasis added) (quoting Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990)). 
For the discretionary function exception to apply, the governmental entity must 
establish that the act in question satisfies each of the following criteria: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one 
which would not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or 
objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved! 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite con-
stitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the chal-
lenged act, omission, or decision? 
Price v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 2000 UT App 333, U 38, 14 P.3d 702 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Truiillo f 27). 
1. UDOT failed to establish that the decisions to omit the concrete barrier 
was "essential to the realization" of a basic governmental objective. 
To establish that Mr. Johnson's claim against UDOT is barred under the dis-
cretionary function exception, UDOT must show that as a matter of law, using barrels 
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instead of concrete barriers to separate traffic from the work zone was essential to 
accomplishing a basic governmental objective: 
Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that [basic governmental] policy, program, or objective 
as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of the 
policy, program, or objective? 
Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995) (quotation omitted). UDOT's position fails 
because it is patently obvious that omitting the concrete barrier was not essential to accom-
plishing any basic governmental goal. Instead, the decision regarding whether to use 
barrels or a barrier was a decision "which would not change the course or direction of the 
policy, program, or objective." 
In its opening memorandum below, UDOT claimed that the discretionary function 
exception applied because the present case was supposedly analogous to Keegan. In 
Keegan, the Utah Supreme Court held that discretionary immunity protected UDOTs dec-
ision not to upgrade already-existing median barriers on 1-80 in Parley's Canyon. Keegan, 
896 P.2d 618. After the barriers were installed, two overlay projects raised the road level, 
effectively reducing the height of the barrier, and the plaintiffs husband was killed when his 
car climbed the barrier and slid into a bridge support. The court noted that UDOT had gone 
through a detailed process in deciding not to raise the barrier, including a creating both a 
safety study that "comprehensively]" analyzed and compared accident rates and a "cost-
benefit report" that addressed numerous significant factors such as the cost, the fact that the 
highway was to be redone in a few years, the delays and inconvenience of an additional 
construction project, and the fact that the job would be exceedingly difficult given the short 
29 
construction season. See Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. The study and report were compiled by 
senior engineers and "circulated throughout and debated within the department." Id. 
Thus, in Keegan, the decision to wait to raise the median barrier was justified as 
furthering the State's governmental policies of providing effective and efficient freeway 
transportation. The costs involved in such a project would have been enormous, and 
upgrading the barriers would have required significant delays and disruption to persons 
depending on the freeway, which of course provides the only access to Salt Lake and Davis 
Counties from the east. 
In contrast, the decision in the present case did not further any basic governmental 
objectives. The decision certainly did not further the government's interest in providing safe 
travel, because everyone has agreed all along that using barrels was significantly less safe 
than using a concrete barrier. The decision did not further the government's interest in 
avoiding delays, because using concrete barriers would have allowed the project to be 
completed several weeks sooner; at the time, Granite stated that using barriers would allow 
the work to be completed in 28 fewer days, compared to 140 days allocated originally (a 
savings of twenty percent). (See Letter from Granite Construction to UDOT, March 29, 
1996, R. 757-58.) And using barrels certainly did not further the governmental policy of 
avoiding driver inconvenience, because using barriers would have enabled two lanes of 
traffic to remain open - safely -- at all times. (See id. ("Phasing the work with precast 
barriers allows for two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times.").) 
The only reason UDOT chose not to use barrels was to save some money. Granite 
was willing to install barriers for about $500,000, but UDOT was willing to spend only 
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$450,000. (See Letter from Granite Construction to UDOT, April 11, 1996, R. 765.) In 
fact, UDOT admits that if Granite were willing to pay for barriers, they could have been 
used, which shows that UDOT did not really care about any of the other factors. (UDOT 
Memo, at R. 688, f^ 23.) The mere fact that the more dangerous alternative was cheaper, 
however, cannot be enough to immunize a governmental entity from liability, because 
otherwise practically every governmental decision would be immunized. 
Simply put, every safety feature costs money. For example, it would be cheaper for 
a municipality to decide not to replace the brakes on any of its garbage trucks, or even to 
have its employees run red lights to save time. Therefore, that a safety feature costs money 
cannot in and of itself bt enough to immunize a decision not to use that feature. Otherwise, 
the discretionary function exception would swallow the entire waiver of governmental 
immunity, and the discretionary function exception would lose its "limited" status. Once 
again, the discretionary function exception was not designed to "cloak the ancient doctrine 
of sovereign immunity in modern garb." Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d at 575. 
Mr. Johnson acknowledges that some Utah cases suggest that decisions regarding 
public funding of safety improvements are subject to immunity. But those cases are dis-
tinguishable because the claims were based on a governmental entity's failure to signif-
icantly and expensively upgrade existing facilities, and in those cases choosing to upgrade 
the facilities would have considerably impacted the governmental entity's ability to 
undertake other governmental activities. The classic examples are Duncan v. Union Pacific 
and Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway, which involved UDOT's improve-
ment program for railway-highway crossings. See Duncan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 842 P.2d 
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832, 834 (Utah 1992); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R„ 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Federal funding allowed eight to ten crossings to be upgraded each year, and 
UDOT used a FHA-approved "hazard rating index" to determine the priority of the 1000+ 
crossings in Utah that lacked active warning devices. Duncan, 842 P.2d at 834. Obviously, 
with limited funding available to improve the railroad crossings, the choice to improve one 
particular crossing meant that another crossing would be left unimproved for another year. 
Both this Court (in Gleave) and the Utah Supreme Court (in Duncan) held that UDOT's 
decisions in setting priorities fell within the discretionary function exception. 
Similarly, in Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007, the plaintiffs 
husband was killed when a thirty-foot-long irrigation pipe he was carrying contacted a 
power line twenty-eight feet overhead. Id. ffif 2, 24. The height of the power lines far 
exceeded the applicable industry safety standards, which required only eighteen feet of 
ground clearance. Id. ^ 24. The plaintiff alleged that the city was negligent in choosing not 
to improve the power lines or to provide warning signs. Id. If 17. The court held that the 
city would not have the discretion to build power lines that violated industry safety stan-
dards, but the city's decision not to use its limited funds to improve the lines that already 
complied with those standards was protected by the discretionary function exception. Id. 
fflf 25-26. Evidence in the record indicated that insulating or raising the power lines in the 
city would have cost more than 128% of the city's total budget for the year the accident took 
place, which would have implicated the city's ability to allocate its limited funds among all 
of its responsibilities. See Laney v. Fairview City, Brief of Appellee, at 3-4. Accordingly, 
the court stressed that its holding in Laney was "consistent with cases that have generally 
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held that decisions balancing the need for safety improvements against limited govern-
mental funding are entitled to discretionary function immunity." Laney at ^  23. 
In the present case, however, there is no evidence suggesting that using concrete 
barriers for the Layton-Clearfield Project would have significantly impacted UDOT's 
budget, prevented safety or highway improvements elsewhere, or otherwise affected 
UDOT's ability to perform its governmental duties. Using barriers would have cost $50,000 
more than UDOT was willing to spend, but UDOT did not show that that amount was 
enough to affect its operations. In fiscal year 1995, the Legislature appropriated over $220 
million to UDOT for construction, including $106 million for rehabilitation and pre-
servation and $104 million for new construction. See 1995 Utah Laws ch. 322, § 1, Items 
257-58.5 Without evidence that the additional cost would impact UDOT or its other 
programs in any way, UDOT has not shown as a matter of law that the decision to omit con-
crete barriers was "essential" to the realization of any fundamental governmental objective. 
UDOT chose to save money by increasing the risks to the driving public - its 
"customers." (Much of UDOT's budget comes from the Transportation Fund, which is 
funded by gasoline taxes. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 72-1-102, 59-13-201 et seq.) But there 
was nothing "governmental" in that choice; countless private property owners, manu-
facturers, and business enterprises have to weigh cost versus customer safety every day. 
And courts have no problem deciding that when the choice was unreasonable, and someone 
D
 Indeed, the contract price for the Layton-Clearfield Project alone was five million 
dollars, so using the concrete barriers would have only increased the cost of that one project 
by ten percent. (See UDOT-Granite Contract, R. 721 (reflecting total contract price of 
$4,998,249).) 
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is injured as a result, the person making that choice must answer in damages. There is no 
policy-based reason why UDOT should not be held to answer for the injuries that directly 
resulted from its decision. 
2. Defendant failed to establish that the decisions at issue required the 
actual exercise of basic policy evaluation at the immunized policy-
making level. 
Additionally, UDOT failed to establish that the decision to omit concrete barriers 
resulted from "the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part 
of the governmental agency involved." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. To meet this element, 
UDOT must show that the decisions regarding the barriers were "the result of serious and 
extensive policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise," and that a "conscious balancing of 
risks and advantages took place" at the "immunized policy-making level." Trujillo, 1999 
UT App 227, 1HJ27, 33, 986 P.2d 752; Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 
P.2d49, 51 (Utah 1983). 
The decision to omit concrete barriers was made by Dyke LeFevre, UDOTfs Region 
One Director. (See LeFevre Aff., R. 712, f 13.) However, the barrels were part of the 
original Traffic Control Plan that was designed by an unnamed design engineer. (See 
LeFevre Depo., R. 932-35.) Mr. LeFevre testified in his affidavit that this decision was 
made "in consultation with UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham," but Mr. LeFevre 
subsequently admitted in his deposition that he was "not sure I talked to him specifically 
about the barrels. What I talked to him is the project is ready to go and I feel comfortable 
with what's going on." (LeFevre Depo., R. 936-37.) Mr. Topham was involved only in the 
decision not to accept Granite's proposed change order, and then only briefly. (Deposition 
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of Clinton D. Topham, R. 1068.) In fact, LeFevre said that Topham left the decision up to 
LeFevre, to be decided based on costs. (See LeFevre Depo. at 938-39.) 
The evidence UDOT submitted is not sufficient to establish that Mr. LeFevre's 
decision required the actual exercise of "basic policy evaluation" or that the decision was 
made by someone "at the immunized policy-making level." First, regarding basic policy 
evaluation, Mr. Johnson has already shown that the decision to omit concrete barriers could 
not have been justified by any basic governmental policies, other than a desire to save some 
money. All non-cost issues such as safety, traffic congestion, and length of construction 
time weighed in favor of concrete barriers, because using barriers would have resulted in a 
safer project that would have been completed sooner and allowed more lanes to remain 
open at all times. Once again, this case is a far cry from Keegan, in which the UDOT 
. commissioned two specific studies and circulated them throughout the department. 
Regardless of what Mr. LeFevre claims after the fact, a jury could easily infer that Mr. 
LeFevre did not actually consider any of these fundamental policy factors in deciding to 
forego concrete barriers.6 
Second, UDOT did not establish as a matter of law that Mr. LeFevre acted at the 
"immunized, policy-making level." UDOT claims that Mr. LeFevre was "personally in 
6
 Additionally, it would be improper to grant (or uphold) summary judgment relying, 
or too heavily, on Mr. LeFevre's uncorroborated affidavit testimony about his own thought 
processes. Such testimony falls within the rule that when a party's own state of mind is 
dispositive, that party cannot automatically obtain summary judgment simply by signing an 
affidavit. See, e.g., Croley v. Matson Nav. Co., 434 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970) ("The court 
should be cautious in granting a motion for summary judgment when resolution of the 
dispositive issue requires a determination of state of mind."). See generally, 10B Wright, 
Miller & Kane, Federal Prac. & Proc: Civil 3d § 2730 (1998). 
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charge of all transportation-related matters for [Region One]," but there is nothing indic-
ating that Mr. LeFevre was responsible for deciding matters of policy. (See LeFevre Aff. 
ffl[ 3-4, R. 710.) Mr. LeFevre was an engineer, not a policy-maker. In fact, the Utah Code 
states that the region director's job is to Mexecut[e] department policy within the region," not 
decide it. Utah Code Ann. § 72-l-205(3)(a) (emphasis added). Mr. LeFevre testified in his 
deposition that there was nothing special about the decisions he made regarding the Layton-
Clearfield Project; those decisions were no different than the types of decisions he made 
every day. (LeFevre Depo., R. 941-42.) 
Once again, the discretionary function exception is designed to protect the process of 
governing - of making choices between competing policies that affect the government's 
citizens. All UDOT has shown is that making the project safer would have cost some extra 
money, but if this were enough to shield a governmental entity from liability, then the Act 
itself would be meaningless, because every negligent act would be "discretionary" and 
therefore immunized from liability. UDOT has not shown that any significant 
"governmental" factors or policies were involved in deciding not to spend the money — 
instead, UDOT simply chose not to spend additional money to provide a safer product for 
its customers. UDOT is not immune from liability for the consequences of its choice. 
CONCLUSION 
UDOT has a nondelegable duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that Utah's state 
highways, including Interstate 15, are reasonably safe. This duty does not go away when 
the road is under construction, nor does it go away when UDOT chooses to have a third 
party, instead of its own crews, work on the road. Further, the discretionary function 
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exception does not automatically immunize every decision by a governmental entity to save 
money by foregoing safety. Plaintiff/Appellant Craig Johnson therefore respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand the matter 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
DATED: December jv , 2003. 
GRIDLEY WARD & SHAW 
Erik M. Ward 
Lindy W. Van Dyke 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
$A. ***-
Stephen P. Horvat 
Attorneys for Appellant Craig Johnson 
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I hereby certify that on the 1^ day of December, 2003, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be served via first class 
mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott W. Christensen 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen J. Trayner 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
1. Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal With Prejudice, R. 1157-60. 
2. Photographs, R. 910-12. 
3. Traffic Control Plan Diagrams, R. 900, 951. 
4. FHA Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs in Construction and 
Maintenance Work Zones, R. 957-58. 
5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). 
6. Restatement (Second) of Torts §418(1965). 
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Stephen J. Trayner, #4928 
H. Scott Jacobson, #8469 
STRONG & HANNl 
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT 
Nine Exchange Place 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 323-2090 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH, 
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, 
JOHN DOES l-V, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 970700411 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
The above entitled matter came before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay on the 1S 
day of November, 2002, for hearing on defendant Utah Department of Transportation's 
("UDOT") Motion for Summary Judgment. Attorney H. Scott Jacobson appeared for 
defendant UDOT, attorneys Erik M. Ward and Christopher L. Shaw appeared for plaintiff 
JAN g i003 
layton District Court 
Craig Johnson, and attorney Scott W. Christensen appeared for defendant Granite 
Construction. The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, and having heard 
the arguments of counsel for UDOT and plaintiff, and being otherwise fully apprised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary 
judgment on plaintiffs claims against UDOT. Specifically, the Court finds that Facts 1 -20 
on pages 1 -4 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment 
do not conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, and therefore, those facts do not dispute UDOTs Statement of Facts. 
While plaintiffs response to UDOT Facts 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 26, found on 
pages 5-8 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
does conform with Rule 4-501, plaintiffs response to those facts does not establish any 
genuine issues of fact which would preclude summary judgment. 
2. For the reasons stated in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting memoranda, and for the reasons stated by UDOT's counsel during the 
November 13, 2002 orai arguments, plaintiffs claims against UDOT must fail as a matter 
of law. 
3. The decisions made by UDOT Region One Director Dyke LeFevre 
surrounding the use of plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-
2 
Clearfield Project were decisions made at the policy-making level, and were immune from 
liability under the discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1); see also Keeqan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1995). 
4. Although plaintiff still has separate claims pending against co-defendant 
Granite Construction, there is no reason to delay the entry of final judgment on plaintiffs 
claims against UDOT. 
5. In order to avoid the possibility of multiple trials, the remaining claims 
between plaintiff and Granite Construction should be stayed pending the resolution of any 
appeal by plaintiff of the claims against UDOT. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
2. That all of plaintiffs claims against UDOT are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
3. That UDOT shall be awarded costs as prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in an amount to be established by affidavit, with 
interest to accrue at the rate provided for by law. 
4. That this Judgment shall be certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3 
5. That the remaining claims between plaintiff and Granite Construction shall 
be stayed pending the resolution of any appeal of the dismissal of the claims against 
UDOT. 
DATED this day of _ 
7 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE THOMtfS L KAY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Christopher L^Shaw 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
* & 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Scott W. Christensen 
Attorney for Granite Construction 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \5? day of December, 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE was sent via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Erik M. Ward, Esq. 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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£ Memorandum USDeganmeft 
of Vansccnjfcn 
F*d*vat highway 
AdrnWi trcrtksH 
Washington, P. C. 20590 
Guidelines for Mitigating Pavenent Dropoffs QM OEC I 1986 
in Construction and Maintenance Work Zones-
Chief, Construction and Maintenance Division AHTO? . KHQ*31 
Office of Highway Operations 
Regional Federal Highway Administrators 
Regions 1-10 
Direct Federal ProgrsR Administrator 
One of the problems noted during our 1986 construction reviews and work 
zone safety reviews involves pavement dropoffs adjacent to construction and 
maintenance activities. These dropoffs include, those created by pavenent or 
bridge deck removal work, shoulder excavations, and the placement of new 
layers of pav.ement. When not properly addressed, dropoffs may lead to an 
errant vehicle losing control resulting in property damage, injury, and 
possibly death. It was found that many States do'not have any policy or 
guidelines addressing this hazardous situation/ With the growing nunber 
of 3R/AR projects, there is potential for. dropoff incidents to increase 
significantly. 
To address this concern, information has been compiled and used to develop 
steps to mitigate potentially hazardous dropoffs* These suggested procedures 
are based on findings from recent research, current policies and guidelines 
frafl a nimoer of States, and consideration of construction operations* The 
information presented here is not intended in any way to represent policy or 
to serve as a directive of the FHJrfA, nor does 1t represent or promulgate any 
new standard. Instead, this information 1s to provide guidelines to States 
in the development of their own dropoff policy. 
Any dropoff is considered hazardous, but those greater than 2 inches, left 
overnight, and immediately adjacent to traffic have a high accident potential. 
For such situations, ont or a combination of the following m1tig4t1ng measures 
is recommended; 
1. Specify that the contractor schedule resurfacing or construction 
operations such that no dropoff is left unprotected overnight, or, 
as a minimun, limit the length of the dropoff and the period of 
exposure. 
2. If feasible, place steel plates to cover an excavation or trench. 
A wedge of material around the cover may be required in order to 
assure a smooth transition between the pavsnent and the plate* 
Warning $1ons should be used to alert motorists of the presence 
of steel plates particularly when the plates are on the travel 
lanes. 
2 
3. Place a wedge of material along the face of the dropoff. The wedge 
should consist of stable material placed at a 3:1 or flatter slope. 
Warning signs may be needed 1n advance and throughout the treatment. 
Payment markings or markers are useful in delineating the edge of 
the travel lane. 
4. Place channelizing devices along the traffic side of the hazard and 
maintain a 3-foot wide buffer between the edge of the travel lane and 
the dropoff. The minima spacing of the devices in feet should be, at 
most, twice the speed in miles per hour. Oropoff warning signs should 
be placed 1n advance and throughout the dropoff treatment. 
5. Install portable concrete barriers or other acceptable positive barriers 
with a 2-foot buffer between the barrier face and the traveled way. 
An acceptable crashworthy terminal or flared barriers are required at 
the upstream end of the section. For nighttime use, the barriers must 
be supplemented by standard delineation devices, i.e., paint, 
retroreflectlve tape, markers, or warning lights. 
For dropoffs greater than 5 inches, recommendation 5 fs strongly suggested 
if recommendations 1 or 2 are not feasible. Speed reduction measures need 
to be considered particularly for recommendations 4 and 5, Although these 
mitigating measures are directed to nighttime conditions, dropoffs must also 
be properly addressed during daylight operations* 
we recognize that there may be so*e reluctance by the States to develop a 
dropoff policy or guidelines. The .primary concern that has been stated in 
the past is that the development of such a policy would increase the 
potential for tort liability actions. It has however also ittn stated that 
the existance of properly developed policies and conformance to those 
policies can in fact provide the. State with a good defense against tort 
liability. More Important however, is that such policies will provide 
greater protection from accidents and injuries for the motorist. 
We strongly encourage you to work with the States on the development of such 
policies. If any further information or technical assistance 1s-.needed, 
please contact us at your convenience. 
$*v, K b B. Myers 
Tab 5 
Ch. 15 EMPLOYERS OF CONTRACTORS § 4 ^ 4 
work to be done is to be taken into account; and an inexperienced 
widow employing a contractor to build a house is not to be ex-
pected to have the same information, or to make the same in-
quiries, as to whether the work to be done is likely to create 
a peculiar risk of physical harm to others, or to require special 
precautions, as is a real estate development company employing 
a contractor to build the same house. 
§ 4 1 4 . Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by Em-
ployer 
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, 
but who retains the control of any part of the work, is 
subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose 
safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable 
care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his con-
trol with reasonable care. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. If the employer of an independent contractor retains 
control over the operative detail of doing any part of the work, 
he is subject to liability for the negligence of the employees of 
the contractor engaged therein, under the rules of that part of 
the law of Agency which deals with the relation of master and 
servant. The employer may, however, retain a control less than 
that which is necessary to subject him to liability as master. 
He may retain only the power to direct the order in which the 
work shall be done, or to forbid its being done in a manner likely 
to be dangerous to himself or others. Such a supervisory con-
trol may not subject him to liability under the principles of 
Agency, but he may be liable under the rule stated in this Section 
unless he exercises his supervisory control with reasonable care 
so as to prevent the work which he has ordered to be done from 
causing injury to others. 
b. The rule stated in this Section is usually, though not ex-
clusively, applicable when a principal contractor entrusts a part 
of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman 
superintends the entire job. In such a situation, the principal 
contractor is subject to liability if he fails to prevent the subcon-
tractors from doing even the details of the work in a way un-
reasonably dangerous to others, if he knows or by the exer-
See Appendix for Reporter^ Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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cise of reasonable care should know that the subcontractors' 
work is being so done, and has the opportunity to prevent it 
by exercising the power of control which he has retained in 
himself. So too, he is subject to liability if he knows or should 
know that the subcontractors have carelessly done their work in 
such a way as to create a dangerous condition, and fails to exer-
cise reasonable care either to remedy it himself or by the ex-
ercise of his control cause the subcontractor to do so. 
e. In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, 
the employer must have retained at least some degree of control 
over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that 
he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or re-
sumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make 
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be 
followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a gen-
eral right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not 
mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, 
or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a 
right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do 
the work in his own way. 
§ 4 1 4 A . Duty of Possessor of Land to Prevent Activities 
and Conditions Dangerous to Those Outside of 
Land 
A possessor of land who has employed or permitted an 
independent contractor to do work on the land, and 
knows or has reason to know that the activities of the 
contractor or conditions created by him involve an un-
reasonable risk of physical harm to those outside of 
the land, is subject to liability to them for such harm if 
he fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them 
against it. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. The rule stated in this Section is a special application of 
the general rule stated in § 318, as to the duty of a possessor to 
exercise reasonable care to control the activities of any third 
person using the land. See also § 364, as to conditions on the 
land created by third persons. The rule stated here usually is 
applied in cases of public or private nuisance arising out of ac-
tivities of the contractor, or out of conditions which he has 
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§ 4 1 8 TORTS, SECOND Ch. 15 
§ 4 1 8 . Maintenance of Public Highways and Other Public 
Places 
(1) One who is under a duty to construct or maintain 
a highway in reasonably safe condition for the use of the 
public, and who entrusts its construction, maintenance, 
or repair to an independent contractor, is subject to the 
same liability for physical harm to persons using the 
highway while it is held open for travel during such 
work, caused by the negligent failure of the contractor 
to make it reasonably safe for travel, as though the em-
ployer had retained the work in his own hands. 
(2) The statement in Subsection (1) applies to any place 
which is maintained by a government for the use of 
the public, if the government is under the same duty to 
maintain it in reasonably safe condition as it owes to the 
public in respect to the condition of its highways. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. The rules stated in this Section apply only to harm suf-
fered as a result of the dangerous condition of the highway or 
other public place, as distinguished from harm caused by the 
activities of the contractor. 
Comment on Subsection (1) : 
b. The rule stated in this Subsection is usually applicable 
to impose liability upon a municipality which at common law or 
by statute is under a duty to maintain its highways in reasonably 
safe condition for public travel. It also applies to corporations 
which maintain toll roads or bridges for public travel under a 
franchise. 
The rule may also apply to a contractor who undertakes to 
repair, construct, or maintain a highway, and entrusts the work 
to a subcontractor; or to one who is permitted, for his own pur-
poses, to disturb a highway and undertakes to restore it to safe 
condition. It may apply to the State, where the State owes such 
a duty to the public, and is not immune from suit. The duty 
to construct, maintain, or repair the highway may be statutory, or 
contractual, or merely exist at common law. 
c. Nothing in this Section is intended in any way to af-
fect any immunity which the State, a municipality, or other gov-
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ernment may have from liability. The rule stated here applies 
only where there is no such immunity. 
d. In the case of a public highway, the liability extends 
only to harm received while the highway is held open for travel 
and does not impose liability for harm received by persons travel-
ing upon a road closed to public travel, upon which an adequate 
notice has been given to the effect that the road is closed. This 
is not to say, however, that notice is conclusive of the ques-
tion whether the road is closed; for example, it may be that 
by acquiescing in public use of a road it is in fact held open 
despite notices to the contrary. 
e. The liability for physical harm caused by the negligence 
of the contractor in failing to put or maintain the highway in 
safe condition is the same as though the employer were doing 
the work of construction, maintenance, or repair himself. If 
the harm is caused by the dangerous condition of the highway 
held open by a municipality for public travel, the right of action 
by the person harmed against the municipality is subject to the 
same limitations and conditions and must be enforced by the 
same procedure as though the municipality were itself doing the 
work which it entrusted to the contractor. 
Comment on Subsection (2): 
/ . The statement in this Subsection applies to determine 
the liability of a government which employs an independent con-
tractor to do work in a public park or building maintained by 
it, which work is necessary to put or maintain the park or build-
ing in reasonably safe condition for the use of the public, if the 
government is, in the particular jurisdiction in which the park 
is situated, under the same duty to maintain its parks and pub-
lic buildings in reasonably safe condition for the use of the public 
as it is under to maintain its highways in reasonably safe con-
dition for public travel. 
g. Comments b, c, and e on Subsection (1) are appli-
cable to Subsection (2). 
§ 4 1 9 . Repairs Which Lessor is Under a Duty to His Lessee 
to Make 
A lessor of land who employs an independent contractor 
to perform a duty which the lessor owes to his lessee 
to maintain the leased land in reasonably safe condi-
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